Pakistan India Relations

Partition and the Emergence of Mutual Mistrust

• i. The circumstances surrounding the Partition of British India in 1947 and subsequent events created a profound level of mutual mistrust that has persisted in India–Pakistan relations for seven decades. The Partition resulted in the displacement of millions of people in one of the world’s largest refugee movements.

 

• ii. India inherited the state infrastructure and administrative machinery of the British Raj, whereas Pakistan had to establish its state apparatus entirely from the ground up. The newly formed Government of Pakistan faced significant challenges because it was denied its full share of financial resources and military assets.

 

• iii. A persistent animosity continued between the leadership of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League long after Partition. Indian leaders were convinced that Pakistan would not endure as a stable state and would eventually reunify with India, often described as returning to ‘Mother India’.

 

• iv. As a consequence of these factors, mutual hostility has largely defined the bilateral relationship, with only sporadic interruptions for brief peace initiatives.

 

Wars, Kashmir Dispute, and Repeated Breakdowns in Dialogue

• i. India and Pakistan fought major wars in 1948, 1965, and 1999 over the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, yet neither side allowed the people of the territory to determine their political future. Intermittent efforts at peaceful coexistence, including the Tashkent Agreement (1966) and the Simla Agreement (1972), failed to overcome deep-seated mistrust. 

 

• ii. During the 1980s, contact between the two sides was sporadic, and after the Kashmiri uprising in 1989, foreign secretary–level talks were held from 1991 to 1994. A structured peace process launched in 1997–98 culminated in the Lahore Declaration (1999), but goodwill quickly evaporated following the Kargil crisis.

 

• iii. The peace process revived in January 2004 and progressed for over four years under the Composite Dialogue framework, but it was suspended by India after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Bilateral Comprehensive Dialogue announced in 2015 was halted due to the January 2016 Pathankot attacks before discussions could formally begin.

 

Transformations in Global Order and Shifting Strategic Alignments

• i. The post–Second World War world order is undergoing substantial transformation, with emerging powers increasingly choosing unilateral action that challenges established international law. The ability of the United Nations to play an effective role in conflict resolution has significantly diminished. 

 

• ii. Intensifying major-power rivalry between the United States and China is contributing to the potential formation of hostile global blocs. The era of globalisation and interdependence that dominated international relations after the Cold War has weakened considerably. The forces of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and narrow forms of nationalism are gaining momentum globally.

 

• iii. In response to global geopolitical shifts, the United States has designated India as a crucial ally in its efforts to counterbalance China. With India placed at the core of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Pakistan maintaining a close alignment with China, strategic competition in South Asia has intensified.

 

• iv. Backed by strong US support, Prime Minister Modi’s BJP-led government is actively pursuing the creation of a Hindu Rashtra, a development that has adversely affected minority communities, particularly Muslims and Christians. India is also seeking to position itself as a net security provider in South Asia, a role that is viewed with resentment by many regional states, especially Pakistan.

 

Kashmir Dispute

• i. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is the most intractable issue between India and Pakistan. The dispute originated from the incomplete execution of the Indian Independence Act 1947, which allowed people of Jammu and Kashmir to choose between India and Pakistan.

 

• ii. Pakistan sees it as the root cause of tensions and seeks resolution through UN Security Council frameworks, while India considers Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of the country and rejects discussions altering its borders.

 

• iii. Being a Muslim-majority state contiguous with Pakistan, it was expected to join Pakistan; however, Maharaja Hari Singh’s ambivalence led to rebellion by locals and tribal forces, advancing towards Srinagar. India sent troops on 27 October 1947 after the Maharaja sought help, marking a day Pakistanis and Kashmiris call the ‘Black Day’. Uncertainty exists whether the Instrument of Accession was signed before Indian troops moved in.

 

• iv. The Indian Independence Act 1947 was not implemented with reference to the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) required a plebiscite for determining the state’s political future, but India has consistently refused to implement UN resolutions, insisting on Jammu and Kashmir as part of India.

 

• v. Pakistan has pursued UN processes, diplomatic channels, and support for indigenous Kashmiri voices over seven decades. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have tenaciously resisted Indian rule, while India has continued to subject the Kashmiris to atrocities which are now well documented, including the two reports issued by the UN Human Rights Commissioner in 2018 and 2019.

Indian Actions Since 2019

• i. On 5 August 2019, India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of its constitution, ending statehood and creating two Union Territories: Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, which sharply intensified bilateral tensions. Kashmiris universally opposed this move, demanding restoration of statehood. Pakistan maintained that, according to UN Security Council resolutions, India could not unilaterally alter the status of the disputed territory. 

 

• ii. India issued millions of new domiciles to non-Kashmiris and redrew electoral constituencies, altering demographics. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Order 2020 facilitated permanent residency for outsiders and children of central government officials. On 17 August 2022, voting rights were extended to temporary Indian residents, adding 2.5 million voters to the existing voter list of 7.6 million, a 30 percent increase.

 

• iii. Since 5 August 2019, some 4000 people including minors have been taken into custody and are being kept outside the state. Those who were picked for interrogation have since been missing. More than 6000 unmarked mass graves of the people killed in custody have been discovered. Reports claim that over 108,000 children have orphaned during the last twenty-five years of the conflict.

 

• iv. Indian forces have continued to suppress the fundamental rights of Kashmiris by the presence of 900,000 military troops in the valley. Curfews have been imposed and complete blackout  of all sorts of communication was enforced in the State. Additionally, concerns about diminishing opportunities arise as people from other parts of India settle in Kashmir, reducing educational and job prospects for the local youth.

 

Political and Diplomatic Dimensions

• i. India treats Kashmir as a bilateral issue, rejecting external intervention, and international community largely aligns with India to hide behinds Indian assertions of the dispute being bilateral under the Simla Accord. Pakistan lacks the international influence and economic strength to compel India to accept a solution based on UN Security Council resolutions. Despite this, Pakistan has effectively maintained international attention on the Kashmir issue.

 

• ii. The argument persists that India may only address the dispute when it feels a significant impact, whether in terms of conflict or diplomatic pressure. However, past wars and the stigma around militant armed struggle, especially post-9/11, have not led to resolution. 

 

• iv. Over the past six years, all forms of bilateral engagement, including trade, have been significantly reduced, and diplomatic representation in both countries has been downgraded.

 

Kashmiri Resistance and Diaspora Role

• i. The present-day Kashmiri youth, growing up in a conflict zone for the third generation, witnesses severe atrocities by Indian forces. Expressing their anger through stone-throwing and, in some cases, taking up arms, they face escalating cycles of violence. Social media, exemplified by the figure of Burhan Wani, amplifies their sentiments.

 

• ii. The Kashmiri resistance employs a dual strategy. Firstly, it aims to escalate costs for Indian occupation, facing challenges due to severe oppression. Effective leadership to unify factions against occupation is crucial. 

 

• iii. Secondly, the Kashmiri diaspora, including those in Pakistan, strategically campaigns for financial and legal backing. Legal action, particularly in countries which recognise universal jurisdiction like the UK and Germany, is seen as more impactful when pursued by the Kashmiri diaspora rather than Pakistani institutions or citizens.

 

International Responses

• i. There are international, Pakistani, and even Indian voices of reason that stress the need to find an early political solution of this dispute. Scores of referenced statements of world leaders have spoken for the rights of the Kashmiris, including parliamentarians from the US, the UK, and the EU. 

 

• ii. Some strong voices have also emerged from within India. The UN Secretary General spoke on 8 August 2019 that the UN position was governed by the applicable Security Council resolutions.

 

• iii. The Kashmir dispute is also an issue of international peace and security. The world must also consider the fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear armed states. Continuation of conflict holds high risk for the peace and security of South Asia. Especially as India is shifting from its nuclear doctrines and moving towards pre-emptive strikes, which has a huge domestic consumption and appetite for high drama.

 

• iv. Pakistan must develop its economy and build up ‘indigenous defense capabilities through R&D and a holistic defense and strategic posture to counter India’s military provocations.

 

Status of AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan

• i. The AJK was formed when the Muslims of the State launched a liberation against the Maharaja in 1947 and liberated territories that today constitute the AJK. Established on 24 October 1947, AJK is a nominally self-governing state, over which Pakistan has exercised control without actually incorporating it into Pakistan.

 

• ii. The territories of GB were only notionally under the suzerainty of the Maharaja. The people of GB resent keeping their political future linked to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and have adopted resolutions in their Assembly calling for accession to Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan fought independently for its liberation from Dogra rule, and the region is distinct from Kashmir in terms of ethnicity, language, and geography.

 

• iii. Some experts support merging GB into Pakistan, arguing it is ethnically and geographically distinct from Kashmir, while other analysts believe merging GB without a final settlement could weaken Pakistan’s moral and political position on the Kashmir dispute. 

 

• iv. Successive governments of Pakistan have mulled over the question of merging GB with Pakistan as a provisional province. Some policymakers in Pakistan increasingly lean toward accepting the Line of Control as a permanent border, though this remains controversial.

 

Terrorism and India-Pakistan Relations

• i. Despite enduring mutual mistrust and antagonism since 1947, coupled with the unresolved Kashmir dispute, India’s apprehensions about terrorism have been a significant factor hindering peace and security prospects in South Asia. India attributes terrorism to anti-India militants based in Pakistan and considers the resolution of the terrorism issue a prerequisite for engaging in any form of dialogue with Pakistan.

 

• ii. Terrorism was not a prominent issue between India and Pakistan during the initial fifty years after independence, although both countries experienced occasional incidents. Terrorism became a significant global and regional concern only in the final decade of the twentieth century. 

 

• iii. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 reshaped global priorities and have a profound impact on the geo-strategic dynamics of South Asia. In response to 9/11, the United States rallied the international community against transnational terrorism orchestrated by non-state actors. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which mandated all states to take concrete measures and collaborate in combating terrorism.

 

• iv. Following 9/11, India found an opportunity to align with the United States as a fellow victim of terrorism flowing from what President George Bush termed “radical Islam.” India’s narrative that the Kashmiri resistance to Indian rule in Kashmir constituted Pakistan-sponsored terrorism gained sympathy in the West.

 

• v. The United States also held grievances against Pakistan for supporting the Taliban, particularly the Haqqani network, which was attacking US and Afghan forces, placing Pakistan in what General Musharraf described as “the line of fire.”

 

• vi. India’s post-9/11 narrative was reinforced by two successive terrorist attacks: the attack on the state legislative assembly complex in Srinagar in October 2001 and the attack on the Indian Parliament building in Delhi in December 2001. The Indian government attributed both incidents to Pakistan-based groups, namely Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.

 

• vii. To retaliate against the attack on the Indian Parliament and to address domestic pressure, India deployed hundreds of thousands of troops along the Line of Control and the international border with Pakistan. Pakistan responded by deploying its troops, leading to a ten-month high-risk confrontation that eventually subsided due to the nuclear capabilities of both nations and the reluctance to risk miscalculations.

 

• viii. Despite ongoing tensions, India continued attributing terrorist incidents to Pakistan’s intelligence supporting anti-India militant groups, whereas Pakistan refrained from blaming India for every terrorist attack, including incidents such as the bus bombing in Karachi that killed eleven French citizens.

 

Global War on Terror and Pakistan’s Response

• i. The US invasion of Afghanistan and the launch of the Global War on Terror compelled Pakistan to deploy significant troops along its western border with Afghanistan.

 

• ii. General Musharraf sought to avoid a two-front situation for Pakistan and made multiple attempts to normalize relations with India. The SAARC Summit in January 2004, hosted by Islamabad, provided an opportunity to restart the peace process.

 

• iii. In a joint statement issued on 6 January 2004, Pakistan committed to ensuring that no territory under its control would be used to support terrorism in any manner. Following this commitment, India agreed to resume the Composite Dialogue process, which included eight components, addressing issues such as Kashmir and terrorism.

 

• iv. The Composite Dialogue process gained momentum through confidence-building measures on peace and security, bilateral trade, and people-to-people contacts. Back-channel negotiations led to a four-point formula on Kashmir, and progress was made in confidence-building measures benefiting ordinary Kashmiris on both sides.

 

• v. Initiatives such as cross-Line of Control bus service, designated meeting points, cross-LoC trade, and ceasefire agreements at the LoC were welcomed by both countries. Despite these initiatives, a persistent wave of terrorist incidents continued in both countries, causing pauses and halts in the peace process.

 

• vi. Major disruptions included the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008 and the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008, which led India to halt dialogue efforts.

 

• vii. In 2014, many hoped India would pursue meaningful peace negotiations with Pakistan after India’s newly elected Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, invited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend his inauguration. 

 

• viii. After a brief period of optimism, relations soured in August 2014 when India canceled talks with Pakistan’s foreign minister after the Pakistani high commissioner in India met with Kashmiri separatist leaders.

 

• ix. Revival attempts in 2011 and 2015, driven by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, were disrupted, including the Pathankot attack in January 2016, which led India to suspend the dialogue until Pakistan took action against specific militants.

 

Cross-Border Strikes and Escalations

• i. In September 2016, an attack in Uri resulted in the death of over a dozen Indian soldiers, which India attributed to Pakistan-based militants. India claimed to conduct a surgical strike in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, although Pakistan found no evidence of the strike, creating uncertainty regarding India’s motives.

 

• ii. This period was marked by an uptick in border skirmishes that began in late 2016 and continued into 2018, killing dozens and displacing thousands of civilians on both sides of the Line of Control. 

 

• iii. More than three thousand cross-border strikes were reported in 2017, while nearly one thousand were reported in the first half of 2018. Militants launched attacks in October 2017 against an Indian paramilitary camp near Srinagar and, in February 2018, against an Indian army base in the Jammu region, which killed five soldiers and a civilian. 

 

• iv. During this time, violent demonstrations and anti-India protests calling for an independent Kashmir also continued. Over three hundred people, including civilians, Indian security forces, and militants, were killed in attacks and clashes in 2017. 

 

• v. After months of Indian military operations targeting both Kashmiri militants and demonstrations, India announced in May 2018 that it would observe a cease-fire in Kashmir during the month of Ramadan for the first time in nearly two decades; operations resumed in June 2018. Later in May, India and Pakistan formally agreed to a cease-fire along the disputed Kashmir border that would restore the terms of their 2003 agreement.

 

• vi. In February 2019, a police convoy in Pulwama was attacked, leading India to blame Jaish-e-Mohammad. In response, India conducted an airstrike on what it claimed was a JeM camp in Balakot, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, followed by Pakistan’s retaliatory strike in the Rajauri sector. During the aerial confrontation, Pakistan downed an Indian plane and captured its pilot, who was later released as a de-escalatory measure.

 

• vii. This episode established a new norm of cross-border strikes but did not resolve the underlying tensions between the two countries. Analysts suggested India might have been attempting to establish a precedent of violating Pakistan’s sovereignty through such strikes.

 

Post-2019 Relations

• i. Following the revocation of Article 370, India-administered Kashmir remained under lockdown for over a year, with internet and phone services intermittently cut off and thousands of people detained.

 

• ii. In 2022 and 2023, the Indian central government cracked down on independent media in the region, redrew the electoral map to privilege Hindu-majority areas in Kashmir, and held a G20 tourism meeting in Srinagar. 

 

• iii. In response to the uptick in violence, the Modi government has taken an increasingly militarized response.  Deadly clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces also persisted in 2023.

 

Recent Developments And April 2022 Pahalgam Attack

• i. Throughout 2024, violence persisted in Kashmir as New Delhi intensified efforts to consolidate its territorial control. Militant attacks targeted Indian travelers and workers operating in the region.

 

• ii. In June 2024, militants opened fire on a bus carrying pilgrims to a Hindu shrine in Reasi, killing nine and injuring more than thirty. In October 2024, militants attacked a construction site for a tunnel project connecting Kashmir to Ladakh, resulting in seven fatalities.

 

• iii. Tensions escalated sharply on April 22, 2025, when militants attacked Indian tourists in Kashmir, killing 25 Indian nationals. The incident, which occurred along the Line of Control, became the deadliest attack in India since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

 

• iv. India blamed Pakistan for harboring the group responsible and arrested two Pakistani nationals as suspects. Pakistan categorically denied involvement, arguing that the accusations were unsubstantiated and, according to its defense ministry, possibly indicative of a “false flag operation.”

 

• v. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed condolences to the families of the victims and voiced concern over the loss of innocent lives. India responded by downgrading bilateral relations, including suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, ending the visa-free travel regime, and closing the Attari border crossing.

 

• vi. Pakistan rejected India’s unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, warning that any attempt to alter Pakistan’s water flows would be treated as an act of aggression. Islamabad also closed its airspace to Indian commercial flights, ended special visa arrangements for Indian citizens, and suspended bilateral trade.

 

• vii. In the days that followed, Indian and Pakistani forces exchanged fire daily along the Line of Control. The United States and China urged both states to de-escalate, with Beijing calling for an independent investigation into the attack and the suspects involved. Meanwhile, the two countries issued reciprocal military threats, and India conducted tests of long-range naval missiles.

 

• viii. On April 28, 2025, Pakistan’s defense ministry reported that it believed an Indian military strike on Pakistani territory was imminent, prompting Pakistani forces to reinforce their positions. Simultaneously, India intensified internal security operations in Kashmir, arresting more than 1,500 Kashmiris and demolishing the homes of suspected militants.

 

May 2025 Episode

• i. On May 7, 2025, India launched missile strikes in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, claiming to target terrorist infrastructure. Pakistan rejected these accusations and held that the strikes were unjustified and violated its sovereignty.

 

• ii. The strikes followed two weeks of heightened tensions after a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir. During this period, both states adopted diplomatic and military countermeasures that drew international concern. 

 

• iii. After three days of military exchanges, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on May 10, as the confrontation had brought the two nuclear powers close to open war. The episode demonstrated how quickly escalation could occur between the two states. 

 

• iv. The conflict was more intense than previous flare-ups, with multiple rounds of retaliation undermining regional strategic stability. For the first time, India and Pakistan engaged in drone warfare, signaling a shift toward more technologically advanced confrontation along the Line of Control, where tensions had persisted even during periods of relative calm. 

 

• v. The post-ceasefire dialogue mechanism was viewed as an opportunity for both sides to identify de-escalatory pathways and introduce confidence-building measures.

 

• vi. Two weeks after the terrorist attack, India initiated Operation Sindoor, targeting what it described as terrorist facilities in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. India asserted that its conventional missile strikes were directed at locations allegedly linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad rather than Pakistani military assets. 

 

• vii. Indian officials characterized the strikes as focused and non-escalatory, and domestic media reported the use of SCALP cruise missiles and HAMMER precision-guided munitions fired from Rafale aircraft.

 

• viii. Pakistan strongly condemned the strikes, reporting 31 civilian deaths and 46 injuries, and described the attacks as an act of war and a grave violation of its territorial integrity. Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanun Marsoos in retaliation, employing precision-guided missiles against entities it identified as responsible for supporting terrorism inside Pakistan.

 

• ix. Missile exchanges continued, and both states used drones to target one another’s military infrastructure. During the broader April 22 to May 7 crisis period, regional and international actors issued appeals for restraint.

 

• x. India also implemented unilateral diplomatic actions, including suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, downgrading diplomatic ties, and halting trade, accusing Pakistan of failing to prevent cross-border militancy. Pakistan denied these allegations and warned that it might suspend the 1972 Shimla Agreement, which forms the framework for bilateral dispute resolution.

 

International Dynamics

• i. India and Pakistan presented differing narratives at the UN Security Council. Pakistan called for an independent investigation into the Pahalgam attack, arguing that India provided insufficient evidence of Pakistan’s involvement. India maintained that the missile strikes were retaliation for the terrorist attack, while Pakistan framed its actions as a response to India’s strikes.

 

• ii. The escalation drew significant international attention. The United States supported India against terrorism but urged both sides to resolve the crisis peacefully. Russia condemned terrorism while advocating de-escalation. China called India’s strikes regrettable, opposed terrorism, and offered constructive engagement. Iran also expressed readiness to help de-escalate tensions. Ultimately, a ceasefire was announced on May 10, accompanied by a broad set of dialogues.

 

• iii. Four key implications emerged from the crisis. 
  • 1) First, it marked a new era of technological conflict, with drone warfare playing a prominent role. This development will shape future conflicts as both nations expand conventional and nuclear capabilities, lowering tolerance for risk.

 

• 2) Second, India’s response reflects an evolving posture toward terrorism. The 2025 strikes targeted nine camps, compared to one camp in the 2019 Balakot crisis. Operation Sindoor set benchmarks for India: delivering a strong response to terrorist attacks, rejecting nuclear blackmail, and holding perpetrators accountable regardless of state sponsorship. These measures could influence future border tensions, as terrorism remains a persistent source of conflict.

 

• 3) Third, the conflict highlighted the risk of nuclear escalation and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. The suspension of the IWT occurred during peak summer, when water scarcity is acute. Pakistani officials warned of both conventional and nuclear responses to escalation or water supply interruptions. Disinformation, including false reports of nuclear incidents, further complicated the situation.

 

• 4) Fourth, third-party capabilities affected regional and geopolitical dynamics. For instance, Pakistan claimed it downed Rafale jets using Chinese-made J-10C jets, while French intelligence reported one loss and Indian authorities remained silent. This episode signaled the potential effectiveness of Chinese defense systems against Western platforms, with implications beyond South Asia.

 

Cease Fire Efforts and US Role

• i. Following the ceasefire on May 10, the United States announced that India and Pakistan agreed to immediately stop hostilities and begin talks on multiple issues. Pakistan thanked former U.S. President Trump for his mediation, while India did not acknowledge third-party involvement. 

 

• ii. Despite accusations of ceasefire violations, tensions have since eased. Communication channels between military and diplomatic authorities in both countries have remained open.

 

• iii. The ceasefire talks offer an opportunity to strengthen CBMs and develop off-ramps to prevent future crises. Lessons from existing Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues could guide these efforts, including focusing discussions on a broad set of topics, creating platforms for expressing strategic concerns, and enhancing crisis communication.

 

• iv.  Proposals include a standing working group involving army chiefs and national security advisers from both countries to maintain robust lines of communication.

 

Geopolitics—The Sharpening Alignments

• i. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the conclusion of the Cold War, globalization emerged as a new phenomenon, signifying a phase of global interdependence and envisioning the world as a unified global village.

 

• ii. Globalization emphasized a shift from inter-state conflict to cooperation and collaboration for the common good, with the “Washington Consensus” advocating financial and trade liberalization, privatization, removal of barriers to foreign direct investment, market deregulation, and tax reforms.

 

• iii. In response to the new global cooperative environment, both India and Pakistan shifted towards liberal market economies.

 

• iv. India transitioned from an inward-looking economic model to embracing liberal economics and opened its markets to the world, while Pakistan introduced major economic reforms.

 

• v. Both nations drew inspiration from China’s economic rise, the progress of East Asian countries known as the Asian Tigers, and the global sentiment of an interconnected world.

 

• vi. Despite ongoing differences over Jammu and Kashmir, India and Pakistan began envisioning a more peaceful and prosperous South Asia and engaged in a comprehensive Composite Dialogue.

 

Nuclear Tests and Regional Power Dynamics

• i. The geopolitics of South Asia experienced a significant shift after both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, establishing a new power balance that reduced the likelihood of war.

 

• ii. Despite Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in February 1999 to initiate a positive chapter in the subcontinent’s history, the Kargil crisis disrupted the peace process and set a concerning precedent for military confrontation between the two nuclear powers below the nuclear threshold.

 

Impact of 9/11 on South Asia

• i. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City profoundly impacted the geopolitical landscape, as the US assumed a leading role against transnational terrorism.

 

• ii. The attacks led to a reduction in space for freedom fighters and those under foreign occupation, who were increasingly perceived as terrorists despite their legal right under international law to resist occupiers.

 

• iii. India portrayed the Kashmir freedom struggle as terrorism and justified harsh counterterrorism measures, consistently attributing attacks to Pakistan-based militant groups in an effort to pressure and isolate Pakistan internationally.

 

• iv. However, the US’s reliance on Pakistan for the Global War on Terrorism following the invasion of Afghanistan prevented India from fully isolating Pakistan in global and regional geopolitics.

 

US-Pakistan-India Relations

• i. Pakistan’s relevance to the US diminished over time due to frustrations over the lack of progress against the Afghan Taliban and perceptions that Pakistan was providing sanctuaries to Taliban leadership.

 

• ii. Meanwhile, US-backed Afghan governments under Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani granted significant space to India in Afghanistan, raising suspicions in Pakistan that India was fostering instability.

 

• iii. These concerns about India’s role in Afghanistan were largely ignored by the US and Afghan leadership, while Pakistan faced negative perceptions fueled by Afghan media.

 

• iv. A significant shift occurred in December 2017 with the US’s national security strategy, which prioritized major-power strategic competition with China and Russia over counterterrorism.

 

• v. As the US sought to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, India became the preferred partner in the newly articulated Indo-Pacific Strategy aimed at counterbalancing China’s rise.

 

• vi. The US viewed Pakistan’s economic and military collaboration with China, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as misaligned with its strategic objectives, while Pakistan grew concerned over the deepening US-India strategic partnership.

 

• vii. The US-India partnership was strengthened through agreements such as the 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation (2005), NSG waiver for nuclear commerce (2008), LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018), and BECA (2020).

 

• viii. This alignment empowered Indian leadership, prompting a more assertive approach towards neighboring countries.

 

India’s Military and Nuclear Posture

• i. India’s 2003 nuclear doctrine introduced the threat of “massive retaliation” against any adversary employing nuclear weapons, departing from earlier concepts of proportionate or punitive response.

 

• ii. Ambiguity about India’s nuclear policy persisted, with statements from leaders like Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar suggesting reconsideration of the No First Use principle.

 

• iii. In conventional warfare, India claimed a false surgical strike against Pakistan in September 2016 and conducted a confirmed strike in February 2019, while a BrahMos missile entered Pakistani territory in March 2022, allegedly by accident, raising questions about communication protocols.

 

India as a Regional Security Actor

• i. India aspires to position itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, with 12 main ports and 200 minor ports, aiming to double its ports under the “Sagarmala” vision.

 

• ii. India maintains a growing naval presence with 150 naval vessels, a nuclear-powered submarine, and an aircraft carrier. According to SIPRI, India’s military expenditure in 2021 was $76.6 billion, ranking third globally, whereas Pakistan’s spending ranked 19th in 2017 and 20th in 2018.

 

• iii. India actively participates in US-led coalitions such as the Quad and engages in Indo-Pacific security initiatives, which are viewed as countering China.

 

 

 

China-India Relations

• i. Despite border disputes and hostilities in regions such as the Galwan Valley, India-China economic ties have persisted, with bilateral trade surpassing $125 billion in 2021, making China India’s second-largest trading partner.

 

• ii. China engaged India through formal and informal summits, emphasizing the importance of maintaining “strategic autonomy.”

 

Global Crises and Their Impact

• i. The Russian military operation in Ukraine in February 2022 had implications for South Asia, affecting trade, energy security, and global geopolitics.

 

• ii. India continued buying Russian oil and gas despite Western sanctions, while the US maintained engagement with India through ministerial dialogues.

 

• iii. Pakistan, maintaining friendly ties with major powers, abstained from UN resolutions regarding the invasion, while facing economic challenges due to rising global commodity prices and trade disruptions with India.

 

Hindutva and India’s Domestic Politics

• i. Prime Minister Modi’s government pursues a Hindutva-driven policy aiming to establish a Hindu Rashtra, in alignment with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s ideological goals of cultural and spiritual renaissance.

 

• ii. The RSS defines being “Indian” as believing India to be both a holy land and fatherland, considering followers of Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism as Indians, while viewing Muslims and Christians as outsiders.

 

• iii. Since 2014, policies such as the National Register of Citizens, Citizenship Amendment Act, changes in Jammu and Kashmir’s demographic and electoral policies, and incidents of mob lynching reflect attempts to eliminate non-Hindu elements from India.

 

• iv. The 2021 US annual report on religious freedom highlighted restrictions on religious freedom in India, including increasing attacks on Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindu Dalits, and indigenous communities, while also criticizing Pakistan for blasphemy law application.

 

Implications for India-Pakistan Peace

• i. Assertive Indian leadership, driven by Hindutva ideology, shows reluctance to restart the peace process with Pakistan.

 

• ii. Actions against minority populations, including Muslims, and the use of force in Jammu and Kashmir have further strained bilateral relations.

 

• iii. With limited contacts and lack of engagement, the likelihood of peace between the two nations remains low, and any potential shift in global geopolitics to facilitate re-engagement remains uncertain.

 

• iv. Since 2019, diplomatic and people-to-people engagement between India and Pakistan has been minimal.

 

Geo-economics—The Way Forward

• i. Historically, South Asian inter-state dynamics have been shaped more by geopolitics than geo-economics, which has hindered regional economic integration.

 

• ii. In recent years, geo-economics is gaining prominence as a transformative force in regional interactions, emphasizing economic competition and leveraging geography and resources for political objectives.

 

• iii. Countries like China, Singapore, and the UAE have successfully used geo-economics to achieve superpower status, first-world development, and political stability with global relevance.

 

India, Pakistan, and Regional Geo-economic Influence

• i. India’s sustained economic growth has increased its global and regional political influence, while Bangladesh, under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has effectively leveraged geo-economics for geopolitical gains.

 

• ii. Pakistan has not fully utilized its geography and resources to achieve political or economic success, but the National Security Policy 2022 aims to transform Pakistan’s challenging neighborhood into an economic opportunity.

 

• iii. This approach emphasizes both economic and human security and underlines that geo-economics should be aligned with broader political and strategic objectives, especially given Pakistan’s historical security concerns, particularly regarding India.

 

• iv. Pakistan can reshape its security-centric image by actively pursuing its geo-economic potential and emphasizing its unique geographical position connecting three Asian subregions.

 

• v. By positioning itself as a bridge between civilizations, Pakistan can reduce the likelihood of India resorting to military strikes and potentially allocate resources towards long-term security enhancement.

 

• vi. Pakistan’s economic geography should be treated as an asset requiring medium- to long-term planning, consistent policies, and a skilled workforce.

 

• vii. The National Security Policy focuses on geo-economics and should not be viewed as a threat to geostrategic interests, highlighting the importance of prioritizing economic security to reshape international perceptions positively.

 

Trade as a Geo-economic Tool and Balancing Geo-economics and Geopolitics

• i. Trade is a crucial aspect of geo-economics, and despite the three-year suspension of trade through Wagah, third-country trade continues to the detriment of both nations.

 

• ii. Resuming trade between India and Pakistan is vital, and a phased approach prioritizing essential trade first should precede larger issues like transit and regional integration.

 

• iii. Normalizing political relations, similar to the European Union model, should be a prerequisite for regional integration initiatives.

 

• iv. Challenges to trade include political tensions in India, anti-Pakistan sentiments, and protectionist policies, which may limit incentives for India to engage in regular trade.

 

• v. Pakistan must balance geo-economic initiatives with geopolitical considerations, particularly amid US-China competition in South Asia. While Pakistan benefits from economic ties with China, it should also maintain relations with the US to clarify that projects like CPEC promote regional peace and stability.

 

• vi. In a complex global landscape, Pakistan should aim to maintain economically beneficial ties with all nations, including India, while pursuing regional economic integration.

 

• vii. Opening Pakistan’s territory for transit trade between India and West/Central Asia can enhance geo-economic influence and position Pakistan as a hub connecting three Asian subregions.

 

• viii. Transit traffic has historically been a source of foreign exchange and can promote prosperity, job creation, and regional stability if East-West and North-South connectivity is prioritized.

 

• ix. Facilitating transit trade with India and Central Asian Republics could progress faster than bilateral trade, provided security and logistical issues are addressed.

 

Preconditions for Successful Geo-economics

• i. Successful geo-economic initiatives require enhancing trade and investment regimes, including studying regional trade and investment policies before negotiating FTAs or PTAs, with safeguards for domestic industries.

 

• ii. Expert studies are needed to assess the relevance of regional projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC, TAPI pipeline, CASA electricity project, and the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline.

 

• iii. Non-traditional economic and security threats, including climate change, cybersecurity, and water and food security, must also be addressed.

 

Policy Recommendations and Regional Cooperation

• i. Policymakers should adopt a results-oriented approach, learning from successful regional cooperation models like the EU and ASEAN, focusing on the rule of law and human resource development.

 

• ii. Having largely defeated terrorism, Pakistan should now focus on branding itself as a safe tourist destination and promoting trade with China and India on mutually beneficial terms.

 

• iii. Infrastructure development, such as road and railway links, should be prioritized to maximize connectivity benefits. Defense should remain efficient and focused on deterrence, avoiding an arms race while maintaining national security.

 

• iv. By emphasizing economic opportunities and fostering dialogue, India and Pakistan can reshape the regional geopolitical narrative, using media and public discourse to promote peaceful coexistence through economic cooperation.

 

Conclusion

India and Pakistan’s relationship has been shaped by longstanding mistrust, the unresolved Kashmir dispute, and repeated terrorist incidents, which have hindered sustained dialogue and peace. Despite attempts such as the Composite Dialogue and confidence-building measures, mutual accusations and military confrontations have prevented meaningful cooperation on security issues.

 

Regional geopolitics, including the US-India strategic partnership, China-Pakistan ties, and shifting global power dynamics, have further complicated relations. India’s assertive policies, nuclear posture, and domestic ideological shifts under Hindutva have heightened Pakistan’s security concerns, limiting prospects for engagement.

 

Geo-economics offers a pathway for improving relations. Pakistan’s strategic location connecting three Asian subregions, combined with trade, transit, and regional connectivity, could create mutual economic incentives, reduce security tensions, and promote regional stability. Lessons from models like the EU and ASEAN highlight the importance of aligning economic development with strategic objectives and building institutional mechanisms for cooperation.

 

Ultimately, progress requires both countries to prioritize dialogue, economic engagement, and cooperative security measures. By focusing on shared interests and long-term trust-building, India and Pakistan can shift the regional narrative from confrontation to collaboration, paving the way for a more stable and prosperous South Asia.